

# REPORT

CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 28 January 1955  
25X1

NO. OF PAGES 3

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW) 25X1

**SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.**

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 25X1

1. On 30 October 1954, Pushkin and his adviser Panin had a conference with members of the SED Politbüro. At this conference, which was convened at short notice and which was attended by Ulbricht, Grotewohl, Schirdewan, Oelsner, Rau, Matern, and Max Reimann. Pushkin allegedly issued new directives for the fight against the ratification of the Paris agreements. Pushkin urged that the SED, in an effort to influence the opposition in West Germany and other West European countries as well as the course of international conferences held by the "Weltfriedensrat" and the "Internationaler Frauentag," should make the following official declarations:
- a. The GDR elections on 17 October 1954 were an internal affair. They were not to serve as a pattern for all-German elections (Pushkin, allegedly, criticized the voting procedure applied on 17 October).
  - b. The SED does not intend to impose the political and economic structure of the GDR on West Germany. The SED only proposes that certain reforms such as a land reform and a school reform be carried out in a re-unified Germany and it also wishes that the most important branches of the German heavy industry and of the transportation system be nationalized.
  - c. As indicated by Molotov at the four-power conference in Berlin, the Weimar constitution, after some amendments, could serve as a political basis for a re-unified Germany.
  - d. The GDR Government and the SED accept the SPD action program, according to which only the re-unified German people as a whole is entitled to decide upon its political and economic system.

[illegible]

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

25X1

- 2 -

- e. The GDR and the SED do not raise any demands prejudicing the procedure applied for the reunification of Germany. The People's Chamber and the GDR Government declare their readiness to consider and answer without delay every proposal made by the West German Parliament or the West German Government in regard to the execution of free elections and a peaceful reunification of Germany. The GDR Government and the SED expressly declare that the population of both West and East Germany must have the right to decide themselves and free from any outside intervention on all questions of the future political régime and the structure of the German economy.
2. Pushkin also gave the SED the order to refrain from all activities designed to disturb or damage the relations between East and West Germany. In this respect, Pushkin issued the following directives:
    - a. Political propaganda to be conducted by the press and in public rallies should be concentrated against the "armament-mad" Americans, especially against Dulles and Adenauer.
    - b. Each individual who sided against the rearmament of West Germany means and, if possible, the SED or those bourgeois organizations, the Council and the Peace Council, stated that 12 leading politicians of the East CDU travelled to West Germany on 1 November 1954).
  3. Pushkin also stated that about 100 women had been invited to a conference in Berlin organized by the Presidium of the International Women's Movement. Members of the West German intelligentsia and politicians in opposition to Adenauer would be invited to the conference of the World Peace Council scheduled to be held in Stockholm on 18 November. The two conferences would be used to sharpen the conscience of the world against the implementation of the Paris agreements and the rearmament of Western Germany.
  4. It was furthermore learned from GDR journalists that Pushkin was dissatisfied with the French Communist party and the French pacifists. The rally organized by them on 31 October 1954 was a failure. Herriot and Daladier were also criticized by Pushkin. The Soviet diplomat further stated that the opposition movement in Great Britain, Italy, and other West European countries was rather ineffective. This was still more the case in regard to West Germany. Pushkin believed it possible that the disintegration of the West German Government coalition and a growing opposition against the intended Saar settlement would prevent the ratification of the Paris agreements or would at least involve a considerable delay of this ratification owing to new negotiations between Adenauer and Mendès-France.
  5. The Soviets do not expect an official ban to be imposed against the West German Communist party. They believe that the situation will probably not be changed after the verdict in the trial now pending at the Supreme Court in Karlsruhe. On the other hand, it was expected that the fight against the rearmament of West Germany would increase class struggle to such an extent that police and administrative

SECRET

25X1

SECRET/CONTROL-U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

25X1

25X1

- 3 -

measures may be taken against the KPD. The KPD was prepared for such a development and had switched over from their fight in West German industrial enterprises to underground activities. The possibility that the opposition against the Paris agreements might assume violent proportions was not ruled out.

6. According to East German journalists, the USA was the driving force behind all endeavors to have the Paris agreements ratified as soon as possible. It was, therefore, the most important mission of the world peace camp to delay this ratification as long as possible or even prevent it. The prevention of the rearmament of West Germany was considered to be the severest defeat which the US policy had ever suffered in Europe. The failure to ratify the Paris agreements might induce the Americans to withdraw from Europe.

Comment. The present report supplements previous information on new trends of the Soviet European policy. It appears that the Soviets believe in the possibility of frustrating the Paris agreements without making any real concessions. The information contained in the present report also indicates that the Soviets, in their fight against these agreements, place their reliance more and more on the West German opposition against Adenauer's course.

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# REPORT

CD NO

## Directives for Soviet European Policies

NO OF PAGES:

PLACED  
ACQUIRED

DATE OF INFO.

NO. OF ENCLS.  
LISTED BELOW

25X1

SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO. \_\_\_\_\_

THIS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

On 30 October 1954, Pushkin and his adviser Panin had a conference with members of the SED Politburo. At this conference, which was conducted at short notice and which was attended by Ulbricht, Grottel, Schröder, Gellner, Rau, Malern, and Max Heilmann, Pushkin allegedly issued new directives for the fight against the ratification of the Paris Accords. Pushkin urged that the SED, in an effort to influence the opposition in West Germany and other West European countries as well as the course of international conferences held by the "Weltfriedensrat" and the "Internationaler Kongress" should make the following official declarations:

25X1

The GDR elections on 17 October 1954 were an internal affair. They were not to serve as a pattern for all German elections (Pushkin, allegedly, criticized the voting procedure applied on 17 October).

1. The SED does not intend to impose the political and economic structure of the GDR on West Germany. The SED only proposes that certain reforms such as a land reform and a school reform be carried out in a re-unified Germany and it also wishes that the most important branches of the German heavy industry and of the transportation system be nationalized.

AS indicated by Molotov at the four-power conference in Berlin, the Weimar constitution, after some amendments, could serve as a political basis for a re-unified Germany.

2. The DDR Government and the SED accept the SPD action program, according to which only the re-unified German people as a whole is entitled to decide upon its political and economic system.

25X1

**CLASSIFICATION**

STATE	DATE	NO.	DISTRIBUTION			
OFFICE	TIME	BY				

SECRET

- 2 -

25X1

- e. The GDR and the SED do not raise any demands prejudicing the procedure applied for the reunification of Germany. The People's Chamber and the GDR Government declare their readiness to consider and answer without delay every proposal made by the West German Parliament or the West German Government in regard to the execution of free elections and a peaceful reunification of Germany. The GDR Government and the SED expressly declare that the population of both West and East Germany must have the right to decide themselves and free from any outside intervention on all questions of the future political régime and the structure of the German economy.
2. Pushkin also gave the SED the order to refrain from all activities designed to disturb or damage the relations between East and West Germany. In this respect, Pushkin issued the following directives:
    - a. Political propaganda to be conducted by the press and in public rallies should be concentrated against the "armament-mad" Americans, especially against Dulles and Adenauer.
    - b. Each individual who sided against Adenauer and Dulles and against the rearmament of West Germany was to be supported by all possible means and, if possible, interviewed by representatives of either the SED or those bourgeois parties which belong to the National Council and the Peace Council (it was stated that 12 leading politicians of the East CDU travelled to West Germany on 1 November 1954).
  3. Pushkin also stated that about 100 women had been invited to a conference in Berlin organized by the Presidium of the International Women's Movement. Members of the West German intelligentsia and politicians in opposition to Adenauer would be invited to the conference of the World Peace Council scheduled to be held in Stockholm on 18 November. The two conferences would be used to sharpen the conscience of the world against the implementation of the Paris agreements and the rearmament of Western Germany.
  4. It was furthermore learned from GDR journalists that Pushkin was dissatisfied with the French Communist party and the French pacifists. The rally organized by them on 31 October 1954 was a failure. Herriot and Daladier were also criticized by Pushkin. The Soviet diplomat further stated that the opposition movement in Great Britain, Italy, and other West European countries was rather ineffective. This was still more the case in regard to West Germany. Pushkin believed it possible that the disintegration of the West German Government coalition and a growing opposition against the intended Saar settlement would prevent the ratification of the Paris agreements or would at least involve a considerable delay of this ratification owing to new negotiations between Adenauer and Mendès-France.
  5. The Soviets do not expect an official ban to be imposed against the West German Communist party. They believe that the situation will probably not be changed after the verdict in the trial now pending at the Supreme Court in Karlsruhe. On the other hand, it was expected that the fight against the rearmament of West Germany would increase class struggle to such an extent that police and administrative

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

- 3 -

measures may be taken against the KPD. The KPD was prepared for such a development and had switched over from their fight in West German industrial enterprises to underground activities. The possibility that the opposition against the Paris agreements might assume violent proportions was not ruled out.

6. According to East German journalists, the USA was the driving force behind all endeavors to have the Paris agreements ratified as soon as possible. It was, therefore, the most important mission of the world peace camp to delay this ratification as long as possible or even prevent it. The prevention of the rearmament of West Germany was considered to be the severest defeat which the US policy had ever suffered in Europe. The failure to ratify the Paris agreements might induce the Americans to withdraw from Europe.

25X1

SECRET